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Egor: St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks: The Court's Reinterpretation of t

ST. MARY'S HONOR CTR. v. HICKS: THE
COURT'S REINTERPRETATION OF THE
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK IN
A TITLE VII CASE

-

CAN THE PLAINTIFF

WIN WITHOUT A "SMOKING GUN"?
INTRODUCTION

2 discharge case
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks' is a Title VIW
which, at first blush, seems to severely limit the framework set out in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green3 for proving unlawful discrimination under Title VII. Hicks surprisingly held that a plaintiff who
establishes a prima facie case and shows that the defendant's justification for its actions are incredible is not entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.4 This five to four decision elicited Justice Souter's
adamant dissent which contradicted the majority's application of
McDonnell Douglas.
The implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Hicks are
clearer when you consider the following employment discrimination
scenario: forty percent of a business' work force are black, and blacks
comprise ten percent of the pool of qualified candidates. A minimally
qualified black applicant applies for an opening, is rejected by a
black hiring officer, and the search to fill the opening continues. The
rejected applicant files suit for racial discrimination under Title VII.
Meanwhile, the supervisor who conducted the company's hiring is
fired. 5
According to the majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, a

1. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988) (originally enacted as Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964) [hereinafter Title VII], provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . (1) to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
Id.
3. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
4. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2748.
5. Id. at 2750-51. This hypothetical is the factual underpinning of the majority decision.
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"mockery of justice" would ensue if the dissent's interpretation of
McDonnell Douglas applies.' As the majority stated, this is true because under the dissent's opinion:
not only must the company come forward with some explanation for
the refusal to hire (which it will have to try to confirm out of the
mouth of its now antagonistic former employee), but the jury must
be instructed that, if they find that explanation to be incorrect, they
must assess damages against the company, whether or not they
believe the company was guilty of racial discrimination.7
The Court noted that "[t]he disproportionate minority makeup of the
company's work force and the fact that its hiring officer was [black]
will be irrelevant, because the plaintiff's case can be proved 'indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."'"
The Court's point here is that sometimes there may be a case
where the defendant is incredible, but nonetheless, other evidence
supports a nondiscriminatory motive. In other words, the employer's
pretext may be concealing a benign, nondiscriminatory reason. This is
unrealistic, according to the dissent, because there should always be
evidence available to corroborate a business decision, such as "personnel records." 9
The critical issue Hicks raises is what the factfinder should consider when trying to determine if there has been unlawful discrimination under Title VII. Should it be (a) simply "proof of pretext," or
(b) "a totality of the circumstances" (i.e., all possible reasons hinted
to in record); the majority preferred the latter test while the dissent
favored the former."0 Part I of this Comment outlines the facts of
Hicks. Part II traces the various aspects of its case history. Part III
sets forth the relevant case law preceding the Hicks' decision. Finally,
Part IV harmonizes the majority's rationale with that of the dissent
and concludes that this position does, in practice, provide the plaintiff
with a "fighting chance" and offers alternative interpretations of
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine."

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Texas

2751.
2764 n.12 (Souter, J., dissenting).
2760-61 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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I. TiE HICKS FACTS
Petitioner, St. Mary's Honor Center ("St. Mary's"), a halfway
house operated by the Missouri Department of Corrections and Human Resources ("MDCHR"), employed Melvin Hicks, a black man,
as a correctional officer. 2 Hicks was hired in August 1978 and promoted to the supervisory position of shift commander in February
1980, but was demoted and discharged from this position in 1984.'"
In 1983, MDCHR conducted an extensive investigation of St.
Mary's administration. 4 That investigation found several deficiencies,
including poor upkeep, inadequate security measures and ineffective
rules and regulations." As a result, numerous supervisory changes
were made after this investigation. Steven Long, a white male, became the superintendent and John Powell, also a white male, became
the chief of custody - a position requiring him to assume the role of
Hick's immediate supervisor. 6 Subsequent to these organizational
changes, one less black was employed at St. Mary's. 7
In 1981, a study by the MDCHR found that "too many blacks
were in positions of power at [St.] Mary's, and that the potential for
subversion of the superintendent's power, if the staff became racially
polarized, was very real."' 8 Powell and Long stated, among others,
that they
were not aware of this study at the time of Hicks' dis9
charge.'
Hicks became the subject of frequent disciplinary actions for the
first time after the reorganization, which placed him under the supervision of Powell.' On March 3, 1984 Hicks was suspended for five
days because his subordinates violated institutional rules.2' Hicks was
later demoted from shift commander to correctional officer for his
failure to ensure that his subordinates entered their use of a St.

12. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. at 2746.
13. IL
14.

Id.

15. Hicks v. Saint Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1246 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev'd
and remanded, 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993).
16. Hicks, 756 F. Supp. at 1246.
17. ld.
at 1252.
18. Id. at 1249.
19.

Id.

20. Id. at 1246.
21. Il at 1246-47.
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Mary's vehicle into the official log book.'e For both of these incidents, a four-person disciplinary review board, composed of two
whites and two blacks, met and recommended the appropriate discipline.' Powell was on this board and recommended Hick's discharge.24 On March 29, 1984, Hicks received a letter of reprimand
from Powell for an alleged failure to conduct an adequate investigation of a brawl between inmates that occurred during his shift.' Finally, on June 7, 1984, Hicks was discharged for threatening Powell
during an exchange of heated words which occurred in April, 1984.6
This final disciplinary action, resulting in Hicks' discharge, was initiated by Powell."
II. THE HICKS CASE HISTORY
Hicks initially brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri, alleging that St. Mary's violated §
703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1), and that Long violated Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983,29 by demoting and then discharging him because of his
race.30 After a full bench trial, the court found for St. Mary's and
Long.3 t The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
however, reversed and remanded, 2 and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari.33

22. Id. at 1247.
23. Id
24. Id. at 1247 n.7.
25. Id. at 1247.
26. Id. at 1247-48.
27. Id.
28. See Title VII, supra note 2.
29. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) [hereinafter § 1983], provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
30. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (E.D. Mo. 1991),
rev'd and remanded, 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2742
(1993).
31. Id. at 1252-53.
32. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1992).
33. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
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The district court found that Hicks had established a prima facie
case of racial discrimination because: (1) he was a member of a
protected class; (2) he "met the applicable job qualifications of shift a
commander"; (3) he was demoted and discharged; and (4) his shift
commander's position remained open after his discharge and was
eventually filled by a white male.' The court further found that St.
Mary's and Long introduced evidence of two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Hicks' demotion and discharge, including the severity of Hicks' violations of institutional rules and the overall accumulation of these violations over a short period of time.35 The court
also found that Hicks proved that the reasons adduced by St. Mary's
and Long for his demotion and discharge were not the true reasons.36 First, the court indicated that Hicks was the only person
disciplined for institutional rule violations actually committed by his
subordinates.37 Second, though the chief of custody claimed it was
his policy to discipline the shift commander for his subordinates' rule
violations, shift commanders were not so disciplined. 3' Third, white
employees were not always disciplined for committing more serious39
rule violations than those violations allegedly committed by Hicks.
Fourth, the chief of custody "manufactured" a confrontation between
himself and Hicks that led to Hicks' discharge.'
Nevertheless, the district court concluded that Hicks failed to
overcome his "ultimate burden" by a preponderance of the evidence
that his demotion and discharge were racially motivated.4 In doing
so, the court noted that "although [Hicks] has proven the existence of
a crusade to terminate him, he has not proven that the crusade was
racially rather than personally motivated."'42 The court considered
several facts before making its conclusion. First, though Hicks proved
that he was disciplined more harshly than his co-employees, his black
subordinates who actually committed the institutional rule violations
for which Hicks was disciplined were not disciplined at all.43 Second, the court noted that between January and December of 1984, St.

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Hicks,
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

756 F. Supp. at 1249-50.
1250.
1251.
1250.
1251.
1251-52.
1252.
1251.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

5

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 5
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 12:1

Mary's hired thirteen blacks.' Third, even after the reorganization
the number of blacks at St. Mary's remained virtually constant.4"
Fourth, the full-scale removal of employees from supervisory positions
is often required when an institution is as poorly run as St. Mary's.46
Fifth, after Long became superintendent, two blacks and four whites
held supervisory positions.47 The court noted that if the black person
to whom the chief of custody position initially had been offered had
accepted, then three whites and three blacks would have subsequently
held supervisory positions.48 Sixth, the disciplinary review board that
reviewed Hicks' violations, which led to his demotion, was composed
of two blacks and two whites.49 Lastly, Powell and Long were never
aware of the study which warned that black persons possessed too
much power at St. Mary's." After considering these facts, the district court entered judgments in favor of St. Mary's on the Title VII
action and in favor of Steven Long on the § 1983 action.5 '
However, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded
that once the district court found that Hicks had proven pretext, he
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 2 Accordingly, the court
of appeals reversed the judgments of the district court.5 3
I.

THE RELEVANT CASE LAW

A. The McDonnell Douglas Rule
Some background on the McDonnell Douglas rule is necessary
before exploring its application by the courts. There are basically two
types of actions under Title VII: disparate treatment and disparate
impact. Disparate treatment occurs when an "employer simply treats
some people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin,"' and the plaintiff must "prove that

44. Id.

45. Id.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.

49. Id.
50. The court intimated, however, that had they "heed[ed] the warning of the Davis
study," they would have then violated Title VII. ld. at 1252.
51.

Id. at 1253.

52. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 493 (8th Cir. 1992).
53. Id.
54. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
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the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive."55 Hick's Title
VII claim was based upon a disparate treatment theory.56 The basic
format for proving Title VII disparate treatment was elicited in the
seminal case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 7
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court instituted a three-step
analytical process. First, in order to prove a prima facie case, the
plaintiff in a discharge case must prove that: (1) he was a member of
a protected class; (2) he met the applicable qualifications for his job;
(3) despite these qualifications, he was discharged; and, (4) the position remained open after his discharge and was then filled by a white
male.5" Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, establishment of
the prima facie case, in effect, creates a presumption of racial discrimination.59
Next, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving this prima facie case,
the burden must shift to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."' Thus, the
McDonnell Douglas presumption places upon the defendant the burden of producing an explanation to rebut the prima facie case. Finally, if the defendant succeeds, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons given by the defendant for
the challenged employment action were pretextual.6"
B. The Application of McDonnell Douglas in the Courts
The most significant application of McDonnell Douglas occurred
in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,62 the Supreme
Court decision whose interpretation of McDonnell Douglas is central
to Hicks. The rule is now commonly referred to as the McDonnell

55. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
56. Id.
57. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The elements of the cause of action are the same under both
Title VII and § 1983. See Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 490 (8th Cir.
1992), rev'd and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993); Irby v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d 1418, 1431
(5th Cir. 1984). See also Richmond v. Board of Regents, 957 F.2d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1992);
Briggs v. Anderson, 796 F.2d 1009, 1021 (8th Cir. 1986); Craik v. Minnesota State Univ.
Bd., 731 F.2d 465, 468 n.5 (8th Cir. 1984).
58. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Hicks, 756 F. Supp.
at 1249.
59. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03.
60. Id. at 802.
61. Id. at 804-05. This final stage has been subject to interpretation in later case law
and is the stage in which the controversy in Hicks revolves around.
62. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
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Douglas/Burdine rule.'
The first stage in McDonnell Douglas has been interpreted by
Burdine to be a "rebuttable presumption" of discrimination.' In the
second stage of McDonnell Douglas, the employer's burden of pro-

duction will "frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the
plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."

This second step shifts the burden of production, but not the

burden of persuasion, which "remains at all times with the plaintiff."

At the third step, if the employer carried its burden of pro-

duction, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted
and it "drops from the case. ' Thus, the trier of fact can then proceed directly to the ultimate question of intentional discrimination."
In other words, upon reaching the third stage the employee then must
go forward and prove intentional discrimination by a preponderance
of the evidence.69

In summarizing the plaintiff's burden in the third stage of the
McDonnell Douglas framework, the Burdine Court stated that:
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the
court that [he] has been the victim of intentional discrimination.
[H]e may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that
a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.'0
The interpretation of this passage has been the subject of great controversy and has created divergent views among the circuits.7

63. See Holmes v. Marriott Corp., 831 F. Supp. 691, 696 (S.D. Iowa 1993); Sterling v.
H.P. Hood, Inc., No. 91-CV-1451, 1993 WL 379431, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1993).
64. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 & n.7; Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978).
65. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.
66. Id. at 253.
67. Id. at 255 n.10.
68. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715-16 (1983).
See also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
69. The Court held that the "plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its
true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
70. Id.at 256 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
71. EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992); Hicks v. Saint Mary's
Honor Ctr., 970 F.2d 487, 492-93 (8th Cir. 1992), rev'd and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2742
(1993); Galbraith v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1497 (1992); Lopez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 228 (1991); Samuels v. Raytheon Corp., 934 F.2d 388, 392 (Ist Cir.
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Although the Court carved out this McDonnell DouglaslBurdine
format in 1980, only three years later, in United States Postal Serv.
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,"2 it stated that "[t]he prima facie case
method established in McDonnell Douglas was 'never intended to be
rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is a sensible, orderly way
to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on
the critical question of discrimination."'' 3 Aikens further noted that
because the question of intentional discrimination is "both sensitive
and difficult,"74 it is best resolved by focusing on the ultimate question of discrimination, rather than the individual segments of the
McDonnell Douglas allocation of burdens of proof."
IV. THE HICKS DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
Hicks' ultimate holding dictates that a factfinder's rejection of
the employer's proffered reasons for its actions does not mandate a
finding for the employee as a matter of law.76 In order to sustain a
judgment at law, "there must first be a finding of discrimination."'
Thus, "[ilt is not enough ...
to disbelieve the employer; the
factfinder must believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination."78 In sum, the majority held that if the factfinder deems
the employer's proposed reason for its employment action to be unpersuasive, this determination will not automatically validate the
plaintiff's proffered reason of race.79 This is ultimately a question for

1991); Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1554 (11th Cir. 1990); Holder v. City of
Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 827-28 (4th Cir. 1989); Benzies v. Illinois Dep't of Mental Health &
Developmental Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987);
Tye v. Board of Educ., 811 F.2d 315, 320 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987);
Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 639-40, 646-47 (5th Cir. 1985);
King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3054 (1992);
Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395-96 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1087 (1984); Clark v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir.
1983).
72. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
73. Id at 715 (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
74. Id. at 716.
75. Id. at 716-17.
76. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2746-50 (1993).
77. Id. at 2749 n.4 (emphasis omitted).
78. Id. at 2754.
79. Id. at 2756.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1994

9

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 5
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 12:1

the factfinder to decide.?
In reaching this holding, Hicks reinterpreted and reconciled the
McDonnell DouglaslBurdine rule. In particular, the Court reconciled
Burdine's summarization of the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas
framework, which states that once an employer meets his burden of
production the plaintiff must have an opportunity to prove pretexts.81
Basically, the majority wrote this off as inadvertent dicta by emphasizing that the plaintiff at all times retains the ultimate burden of
proving that an employer's action was prompted by an impermissible
motive.82 The third stage of McDonnell DouglaslBurdine is further
reconciled by the Court's interpretation of "pretext," which - according to the Court - should always be read to mean "pretext for discrimination."'83
Turning to the Court's analysis, the majority first dealt with
whether a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas mandates a
finding of intentional discrimination.' According to the majority,
"[q]uite obviously" much less proof is required for a prima facie case
than for a directed verdict.85 The Court noted that the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie presumption only exists to force the defendant to
offer "some" response to a prima facie case.86 If a defendant does
so, then the "trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question:
whether plaintiff has proven 'that the defendant intentionally discriminated against [him]' because of his race."' At that point, "[t]he presumption, having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come
forward with some response, simply drops out of the picture."88
Therefore, if the "defendant has succeeded in carrying its burden of
production, the McDonnell Douglas framework - with its presumptions and burdens - is no longer relevant." 89
Nevertheless, if the factfinder disbelieves the defendant's reason
then it may infer intentional discrimination without any additional

80. Id.
81. See infra note 95.
82. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752-53 (1993).
83. See infra text accompanying note 98.
84. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2747.
85. Id. at 2751 (stating that the "McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is infinitely less
than what a directed verdict demands").
86. lId at 2749.
87. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)).
88. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255).
89. Id.
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proof.'° The Court noted that pretext "accompanied by a suspicion of
mendacity may, together with the elements of the prima facie case,
suffice to show intentional discrimination."' Therefore, in some instances, a plaintiff may meet his ultimate burden of proof by combining proof of the elements constituting a prima facie case with evidence that defendant's proffered reasons for its acts were false. However, it is important to note that such finding of pretext does not
always warrant a finding of illegal discrimination. 9 The Court stated
that the application of such a rule "disregards the fundamental principle of Rule 301 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which states] that
a presumption does not shift the burden of proof."'93 The Court then
reaffirmed the long-standing principle that "the Title VII plaintiff at
all times bears the 'ultimate burden of persuasion."'"
The Court then took issue with a number of interpretations made
by the dissent. First, the Court vehemently disapproved of the
95
dissent's reading of the third stage of McDonnell DouglaslBurdine.

This stage is understood by the dissent to mean that the plaintiff wins
merely if he proves pretext.96 In disagreeing, the majority stated that
a "reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for discrimination' unless
it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. FED. R. EvID. 301 reads as follows:
In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise provided for by Act of Congress
or by these rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed
the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but
does not shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of
nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the trial upon the party on whom it was
originally cast.
Id.
94. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 (citing United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)). Other cases in which the Court utilized this principle
include Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 187 (1989); Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 245-46 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,
659-60 (1989); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988); Cooper v.
Fed. Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 875 (1984).
95. This third stage states that:
[The plaintiff must then [, after the employer has met his burden of adducing a
nondiscriminatory reason,] have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true
reasons, but [rather] were a pretext for discrimination.
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1980) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973)).
96. See infra text accompanying notes 138-142.
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was the real reason."' According to the majority, the McDonnell
DouglaslBurdine meaning of "pretext" is alluded to as meaning "pretext for discrimination."98 Thus, the majority reconciled McDonnell
DouglaslBurdine by making a distinction between "pretext" and "pretext for discrimination," the latter being what is necessary to compel
a judgment.
Next the Court reconciled Burdine's troubling phrase, stating that
"the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity" once the
employer has met his burden of production." This, as the Court noted, is not inquiring whether the employer's asserted reason is true or
false; rather, this means that the "inquiry now turns from the few
generalized factors that establish a prima facie case to the specific
proofs and rebuttals of discriminatory motivation the parties have
introduced."' "r°
The next problematic phrase in Burdine is that "placing this
burden of production on the defendant thus serves ...
to frame the
factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a
full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."'0 ' As read by the
majority, this does not mean that the only factual issue remaining is
whether the employer's reason is false, because "pretext" here means
"pretext for discrimination."" The Court noted that this simply addresses the "form rather than the substance of the defendant's production burden: The requirement that the employer 'clearly set forth' its
reasons, gives the plaintiff a 'full and fair' rebuttal opportunity. ''" °"
Another hurdle the Court overcame is Burdine's statement that
the plaintiff "now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the
proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the
court that [he] has been the victim of intentional discrimination.""
The Court disagreed with the dissent's reading which held that

97.
98.

St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993).
Id. at 2752 & n.6 (citations omitted). In McDonnell Douglas the Court stated that

with respect to pretext for the sort of discrimination prohibited by Title VII, a plaintiff "must
be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory
decision." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
99. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255).
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56).
102. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
103. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752 (citations omitted).
104. l (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
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"merger" means that pretext supplants the ultimate burden of persuasion and, thus, if the employer's proffered reasons are pretextual, then
the plaintiff is entitled to judgment."10 The Court noted that this
reading would be unreasonable because it would be a merger "in
which the little fish swallows the big one."'" Instead, according to
the majority, a reasonable reading would suggest that "proving the
employer's reason false becomes part of (and often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real reason was intentional discrimination. ' '1°7
The most troublesome language which the majority reconciles in
reaching its holding is where Burdine states that the plaintiff may
succeed in persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination "either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy
of credence."'' 3 The majority conceded that this must mean that if
the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence then the
plaintiff must win."° The Court, nevertheless, concluded that this
"dictum contradicts or renders inexplicable numerous other statements,
both in Burdine itself and in our later case-law."" Further, the
Court reconciled this by finding that this dictum "must be regarded as
an inadvertence, to the extent that it describes disproof of defendant's
reasons as a totally independent, rather than an auxiliary, means of
proving unlawful intent.""' Otherwise, as the Court noted, such a
scheme would be analogous to a criminal case in which a trier of
fact's disbelief of the defendant's alibi would warrant a guilty verdict." 2

105. See infra text accompanying notes 138-142.
106. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752.
107. Id
108. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2752-53; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 n.18 (1973)
(noting "[w]e . . . insist that respondent under § 703(a)(1) must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that whatever the stated reasons for his rejection, the decision was in reality racially premised") (emphasis omitted).
Burdine held that "[tihe ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff."
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1980).
111. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2753.
112. See id.at 2753 n.7. The dissent failed to raise (perhaps the dissent felt it too trivial
to include) the obvious point that this analogy is fatally flawed given the different burdens of
proof in a criminal case as opposed to a civil case.
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The Court raised the dissent's and respondent's point that this
reading favors employers who lie over employers who remain silent,
since a phony reason will enable the employer to survive a judgement
and a silent employer will suffer a judgment."' The majority responds by pointing out that the "McDonnell Douglas presumption is a
procedural device, designed only to establish an order of proof and
production."... 4 Moreover, this like many other procedural devices
places "perjurer[s] (initially, at least) in a better position than the
truthful litigant who makes no response at all....
Next the Court responded to the dissent's argument that now,
after all burdens of production are met, the factual inquiry "is wide
open, not limited at all by the scope of the employer's proffered
explanation" since the plaintiff now must rebut any and all conceivable explanations that may be "lurking in the record.' 6 The majority states that this argument wrongly implies that the "articulated reasons" somehow exist "apart from the record.""7 However, "lurking
in the record" is precisely where the Court noted that the defendant's
reasons are to be set forth."' Since the defendant's reasons are to
be set forth "through the introduction of admissible evidence,' ' no
unarticulated reason will be interjected into the trial.
Finally, the Court mentioned the strong policy behind Title VII
discrimination cases and the difficultly proving them. 2 ' Notwithstanding such issues, the majority, citing Aikens, stated that this does
not mean that "courts should treat discrimination differently from
other ultimate questions of fact.'' Thus, courts should simply apply the legal rules of allocating the burdens and proof and not otherwise alter the ultimate issue of unlawful discrimination.'"

113. Id. at 2754-55
114. Id. at 2755.
115. For example, defendants will suffer a judgment if they fail to answer a complaint,
fail to contest critical a;erments in a complaint, or fail to submit affidavits creating a genuine issue of fact. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (emphasis in original).
118. Id. Although the reasons may be "vaguely" suggested, nevertheless, they must still
be "articulated reasons" represented in the record. Id. at 2755-56.
119. Id. at 2755 (quoting Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

255 (1981)).
120.

Id at 2756.

121. Id.
122. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol12/iss1/5

14

Egor: St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks: The Court's Reinterpretation of t
1994]

St. Mary's Honor Cr. v. Hicks

B. The Dissent's Opinion in Hicks
The dissent emphasized that McDonnell DouglaslBurdine's central purpose is "to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination."'" It follows, the dissent argued,
that if the plaintiff is to have a fair opportunity to disprove the
defendant's reasons, subtle discrimination can only be rooted out
through circumstantial evidence, and the Court's finding is inapposite
to this reasoning."2 The dissent argued that such a formula was
necessary in light of congressional intent under Title VII to thwart
subtle racial discrimination.'"
Therefore, McDonnell DouglaslBurdine devised a framework that "would allow both plaintiffs and
the courts to deal effectively with employment discrimination revealed
only through circumstantial evidence."'"
The dissent argued that a prima facie case raises an inference of
discrimination, since a prima facie case is "indeed a proven case"
(i.e., the elements of a prima facie case are established to a factfinder
by a preponderance of the evidence). 27 The dissent noted that because the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for firing have
been eliminated by a prima facie case, "if otherwise unexplained, [the
employer's acts] are more likely than not based on the consideration
of impermissible factors. '' "u Thus, the dissent noted, once a prima
facie case is shown, "the employer must either respond or lose."' 9
Although the dissent agreed that the presumption of discrimination drops from the case if the employer meets his burden of production, it noted that the McDonnell Douglas framework is still relevant
because the factual inquiry is narrowed to the question of pretext. 3
Without such framework, the dissent stated, it would be "equally
unfair and utterly impractical to saddle the victims of discrimination
with the burden of either producing direct evidence of discriminatory
intent or eliminating the entire universe of possible nondiscriminatory
reasons for a personnel decision.'' The dissent noted that under
123.
124.

Id. at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8).
Id.

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id at 2758 (Souter, J., dissenting).
128. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,

577 (1978)).
129. Id.
130.
131.

Id at 2759 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id at 2758 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent also found the majority scheme as
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the Court's scheme a plaintiff without direct evidence cannot win;

thereby, rendering Burdine's alternative-indirect
method useless and
32

frustrating congressional intent.
The dissent noted that this problem of proving discrimination
without a "smoking gun" was overcome by the McDonnell Douglas
requirement that the employer "articulate" his reasons through admissible evidence.' 33 The dissent noted that this requirement serves two

purposes: (1) to burst the presumption of illegal discrimination, and
(2) to "frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."'3 "
The dissent stressed that the employer, as the bearer of the burden of

production, chooses the scope of factual issues for trial by which he
is then bound.'35 Otherwise, according to the dissent, the employer's
explanation need not be "'clear and reasonably specific' if the
factfinder can rely on a reason not clearly articulated.' ' 36 Moreover,
the dissent reasoned that this must be the case, given Burdine's holding that "the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity"
after the defendant has met his burden.'37
The dissent contended that at the third stage of McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine, the sole factual question is pretext.'
In support
of this proposition, the dissent referred to the language in Burdine
that states that at the third stage the plaintiff must show pretext (that
the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment
decision) and this "merges" with the plaintiff's ultimate burden of
persuasion (that the plaintiff has been the victim of intentional dis-

"unfair to plaintiffs, unworkable in practice, and inexplicable in forgiving employers who
present false evidence in court." Id. at 2761 (Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent disagreed that
the McDonnell Douglas format becomes irrelevant once the employer meets his burden of
production because McDonnell Douglas's central purpose is to progressively "sharpen the
inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination." Id. (quoting Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981)). The dissent called
the majority decision a "flat misreading" of Burdine because the Court holds that the "enquiry is wide open, not limited at all by the scope of the employer's proffered explanation." Id.
As the dissent noted, the requirement that the plaintiff be afforded a full and fair opportunity
to demonstrate pretext means that the factual issues must be limited in the final stage of
McDonnell Douglas. Id.This, as the dissent pointed out, is impossible if the factfinder can
discern from the record reasons not articulated by the employer. Id.
132. See supra text accompanying note 108.
133. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2758-59 (Souter, J.,dissenting).
134. Id. at 2759 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56).
135.

See id.

136. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258).
137. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255).
138. ld. at 2760 & n.8 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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crimination).'39 The dissent attacked the Court's interpretation of
"merger" as contradictory and disharmonious within its immediate
context in Burdine."' This point, the dissent noted, is further illustrated by Burdine's language that the plaintiff can meet this burden of
persuasion "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.' 4 t Therefore, the dissent concluded, this indicates that the
case is narrowed to the question of pretext in the final stage of
42
McDonnell DouglasBurdine.'
The dissent took issue with the Court's interpretation that "pretext for discrimination" should appear where "pretext" actually does
within the case law.'43 The dissent stated that although McDonnell
Douglas does refer to pretext as pretext for discrimination, this was
simply a "sloppy" summarization of its opinion." This sloppy opinion was, as the dissent put it, "nail[ed] down" by Burdine's holding
that the plaintiff's burden will be satisfied by simply proving an
explanation unworthy of credence. 45 The dissent argued that the
"majority's method of proving 'pretext for discrimination' changes
Burdine's 'either ... or' into a 'both ... and.""' The dissent reasons this because the majority requires that the plaintiff must not only
show that the attributed reason for the employment decision was
false, but also that the discrimination was the real reason. 4 Indirect
proof by way of pretexts will never be sufficient because the employer wins a judgment even if the plaintiff proves a prima facie case and
pretexts.'48 The dissent regarded the majority rationale as bootstrapping, due to the majority's heavy reliance that the plaintiff has the
"ultimate burden" of proving discrimination; thus, the dissent contended that the majority never answers the "practical question of how the
plaintiff without such direct evidence can meet this burden."'49
139. Id. at 2760 (Souter, J.,dissenting) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
140. Id. at 2760 n.6 (Souter, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 2760 (Souter, J.,dissenting) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2759-60 n.5 (Souter, J.,dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. l& at 2760 n.7 (Souter, J.,dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 108.
147. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2760 n.7 (Souter, J.,dissenting). The dissent declared this
scheme by the majority to be a "pretext-plus" approach. Id. at 2762 (Souter, J.,dissenting).
148. Id. at 2762 (Souter, J.,dissenting). The dissent recognized an inconsistency in the
majority's holding by noting the majority passage that proof of pretext "without more, 'will
permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination."' Id.
149. Id. at 2761 (Souter, J.,dissenting). This is solved, according to the dissent, by
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The dissent found the Court's holding inconsistent with Title VII
policy 5 ° because the plaintiff now has the "tremendous disadvantage ... of disproving all possible nondiscriminatory reasons that a
factfinder might find lurking in the record.'' The dissent noted
that "common experience" dictates its reading because employers who
lie are most likely trying to cover up discrimination.' Furthermore,
the dissent declared, McDonnell Douglas becomes "meaningless" if
the court can "look beyond the employer's lie by assuming the possible existence of other reasons the employer might have proffered
without lying."' 53 The dissent concluded that the majority is "throwing out the rule for the benefit of employers [who lie]""t because
"[u]nder the majority's scheme, the employer who is caught in a lie,
but succeeds in injecting into the trial an unarticulated reason for its
actions, will win its case and walk away rewarded for its falsehoods."'5 5 This scheme, as the dissent reasoned, will force employers to lie in order to successfully defend a prima facie case of discrimination in which the employer is unable to discover a nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.'56 The dissent surmised that the employer will lie "and then hope that the factfinder will conclude that
the employer may have acted for a reason unknown rather than for a
discriminatory reason.'' 57
The dissent reasoned that the majority's attempt to rest on Aikens
is flawed, since Aikens quotes Burdine's key passage approvingly.'58
Aikens states that the Court must "decide which party's explanation of
the employer's motivation it believes."' 59 The dissent read this pas-

Burdine's alternative, proof of pretext method of meeting the ultimate burden. Id. at 2761-62

(Souter, J., dissenting). The dissent also noted that this is not only practical but crucial "for
the simple reason that employers who discriminate are not likely to announce their discriminatory motive." Id at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting).
150. See ia at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, McDonnell DouglaslBurdine was designed to help prove subtle cases of discrimination. Id. The dissent implied
that Congress' acquiescence in the McDonnell DouglaslBurdine framework infers its approval.
Id at 2765-66 (Souter, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting).
152. Id at 2762-63 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).
153. Id. at 2763 (Souter, J., dissenting).
154. Id

155. Id. at 2764 n.13 (Souter, J., dissenting).
156.
157.
158.
159.
Aikens,

Id at 2764 (Souter, 3., dissenting).
Id.
Id at 2765 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v.
460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
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sage in harmony with its opinion because it "flatly bars the Court's
conclusion here that the factfinder can choose a third explanation,
never offered by the employer.''60
Lastly, the dissent credited the doctrine of stare decisis, which is
particularly strong in statutory interpretation because legislative power
is implicated. 6 ' The dissent noted that congressional silence over
the last twenty years on these cases amounts to acquiescence in
McDonnell Douglas and its progeny. 62 Further, the dissent criticized
the majority for ignoring twenty years of precedent, established
through McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, in which over half of the
circuits have adopted the dissent's scheme.'63 In sum, the dissent
found the majority scheme too burdensome on plaintiffs, ultimately
chilling employees from bringing Title VII actions.'"
V. ANALYSIS
Discrimination is a sensitive issue and a strong national policy
exists to discourage discrimination in the work force. It is necessary
to give plaintiffs the proper opportunities to eliminate discrimination
by their employers. However, Title VII should not be an extension of
affirmative action. As the Court noted 'Title VII... does not impose a duty to adopt a hiring procedure that maximizes hiring of
minority employees."'" Title VII was implemented to effectuate the
national policy of bringing meritorious discrimination claims to court,
but not to put employers in a position where they feel pressured to
hire minorities or else risk losing a Title VII case. It is necessary to
strike a proper balance.
Since neither the majority nor the dissent in Hicks seems to
strike the proper balance needed in these cases, a modification of the
current test is necessary. Each opinion favors too strongly one side or
the other. The majority opinion will, in practice, make it easier to
defend Title VII actions and place too heavy a burden on the plaintiff
to prove his case. On the other hand, the dissent, by simply making
"pretext" the ultimate issue, allows the plaintiff to prevail
disproportionately, because plaintiffs will simply zero in on one prof-

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
Il at 2765-66 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2764-65 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 2763, 2766 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577-78 (1978).
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fered reason and try to discredit it, thereby prevailing without ever
actually proving discriminatory intent.
Although Hicks may seem too fact-bound to generate a rule of
law" and its holding ostensibly favors employers, there is language
in Hicks that permits courts to apply the McDonnell DouglaslBurdine
framework fairly to employees who lack direct evidence of discrimination; thereby striking the aforementioned balance. Specifically,

Hicks states that "[t]he fact finders' disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a

suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima
facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination."'67 Thus, pretext per se will not establish unlawful discrimination, but the plaintiff
may win if an employer's action is strongly suggestive of discrimination and is combined with the prima facie case. A factfinder's disbelief of a defendant's proffered rationale "may" allow it to infer the

ultimate fact of intentional discrimination in some cases. In light of
recent rulings, it seems as though this language has in fact provided a
workable rule that courts have adopted without any great reluctance

or uproar." 8 In answer to the question: "can the plaintiff win with-

166. Seemingly, what the majority has done in Hicks, in clarifying McDonnell DouglaslBurdine, is remove a bright-line rule of "pretext equals discrimination" and substitute a
more fact sensitive one. This is most appropriate in situations like Hicks where the record
reeks of personal animosity as the true motive. To this extent Hicks should be limited to its
facts since there was an evident underlying notion of personal animosity (as the trial court
ultimately held).
167. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749 (emphasis added).
168. See, e.g., Gaworski v. ITT Commercial F'm. Corp., 17 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 1994)
(holding that Hicks established that once a prima facia case of discrimination is proven by
plaintiff, "[n]o additional proof of discrimination is required") (citing Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at
2749) (alteration in original), petition for cert. filed, 63 U.S.L.W. 3067 (July 19, 1994);
Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that plaintiff
may meet the ultimate burden of proof by combining her proof of the elements constituting a
prima facie case with evidence that defendant's proffered reasons for its acts were false and
that a factfinder's disbelief of a defendant's proffered rationale may allow it to infer the
ultimate fact of intentional discrimination in some cases), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1189
(1994); Moore v. Eli Lilly & Co., 990 F.2d 812 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
467 (1993); Nahrebeski v. Cincinnati Milacron Mktg. Co., 835 F. Supp. 1130 (W.D. Mo.
1993) (stating that "Hicks does not announce a new and rigid standard for determining
whether an employer's articulated reason for a particular employment decision is a pretext for
discrimination"); Sterling v. H.P. Hood, Inc., No. 91-CV-1451, 1993 WL 379431 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 22, 1993) (holding that under Hicks, the trier of fact's rejection of the employer's reason for its actions will not entitle judgment for the plaintiff in a sex discrimination claim);
Bradley v. Key Mkt., Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-2023, 1993 WL 386319 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 1993)
(holding a plaintiff's showing that an employer's reason is illegitimate permits the factfinder
to draw the inference that discrimination was the basis for the action); Holmes v. Marriott
Corp., 831 F. Supp. (S.D. Iowa 1993) (finding that rejection of legitimate, non-discriminatory
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out a 'smoking gun'?" the answer is obviously "yes," given the application of Hicks. As a practical matter, Hicks' emphasis on open

minded factual inquiries makes it more likely that trial judges will
send cases to juries rather than rule summarily. 69 This outcome is
not a necessary evil, since these cases most often turn on subtle questions of credibility and intent that only a factfinder faced with a live
witness should decide. Many scholars believe that summary judgment

in civil rights actions has deprived plaintiffs of the fairer, more accurate decision-making assured by a factfinder's decision at trial. 70
It appears that courts will mitigate the harshness of Hicks by
interpreting "direct" evidence of discrimination loosely. For example,
in Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., a sexual discrimination case, the court found "not one but two 'smoking guns."' 172 The
trial court (1) credited plaintiff's testimony about her employer's
threats of reprisal should she complain; and, (2) intimated that
plaintiff's credibility was bolstered by the testimony of a former

employee who described a similar pattern of sexual harassment and

reasons for the challenged employment action offered by the employer under the McDonnell
DouglaslBurdine proof scheme permits the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination without additional proof); May v. Hobart Corp. 839 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (holding that under current law, a factfmder may infer discrimination from proof of
pretext); Brom v. Bozell, Jacobs, Kenyon & Eckhardt, Inc., No. 89 C 7021, 1993 WL
313049 (N.D. Il1. Aug. 13, 1993) (ruling that pretext permits a trier of fact to decide the
ultimate question); Scales v. George Washington Univ., Civ. A. No. 89-0796-LFO, 1993 WL
304016 (D.D.C. July 27, 1993) (holding that a "demonstration that the employer's proffered
reason was pretextual permits the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination"); Elmore v. Capstan, Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-4004-DES, 1993 WL 290259 (D. Kan.
July 8, 1993) (stating that plaintiff need not present direct evidence of discriminatory intent if
he can prove that the defendant's stated reasons for his discharge were a pretext of a racially
discriminatory decision); Saini v. Bloomsburg Univ. Faculty, 826 F. Supp. 882 (M.D. Pa.
1993) (holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact
to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination); Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co.,
503 N.W.2d 225, 228 (N.D. 1993) (commenting that "[t]he Hicks decision does not disturb
the reality that success in establishing the incredibility of the employer's asserted reasons will,
in most instances, insure success for the plaintiff, because the incredibility of the employer's
reasons 'will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination."')
(quoting Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749). But see Wadron v. SL Industries, Inc., 849 F. Supp.
996, 1005 n.11 (D.NJ. 1994) (finding this passage in Hicks to be dicta).
169. See Schwiegert, 503 N.W.2d at 228 (stating that Hicks holds discrimination to be a
matter of fact, not law).
170. See, e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REv. 203
(1993).
171. 4 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1189 (1994).
172. Id. at 141 (emphasis added).
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Moreover, Saulpaugh emphasized that Hicks will not
retaliation.'
cause panic because it does "no more than reiterat[e] the longstanding
rule that despite shifting burdens of production, a plaintiff always
shoulders the ultimate burden of proof."'7
A possible corollary to this decision could be that the employer
is now required to include amongst the possible legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons any genuine reasons, regardless of whether they
are "unseemly or arbitrary... that [have] no relation to any legitimate business objective."' 75 Not only will this help clarify the record, but it will also encourage employers to proffer such a motive if
in fact it is the truth. If courts are to prevent the McDonnell Douglas
format from "be[ing] rendered meaningless," as understood by the
dissent,'76 the reason of personal animosity should be mandated
among the realm of "legitimate nondiscriminatory" reasons.'" This
reason, which the employer must adduce as a rebuttal to plaintiff's
prima facie case, or be barred from raising it, would in turn entitle
the employer to a judgment if the plaintiff is unable to show this
reason (personal animosity) is unworthy of credence. On the other
hand, if the employee is able to show that personal animosity is a
pretext, then a factfinder may infer discriminatory intent.
This reading would, in effect, appease both the majority and the
dissent. The majority would be content since pretext still would, as
they held, not suffice in itself to render a judgment in plaintiff's
favor. The dissent would approve of this reading because the employer would be forced to raise "personal animosity" as a "legitimate
nondiscriminatory" reason or else forfeit such a defense.'78 This
would perpetuate what the dissent sees as the central purpose of
McDonnell Douglas, i.e., the narrowing and focusing of issues necessary for plaintiffs to prove a Title VII case of discrimination.' This
would "frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the
plaintiff [would] have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pre-

173. Id.
174. Id. at 142.
175. Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the
"Pretext-Plus" Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS W. 57, 137 (1991)
(arguing that any reason, including an illegal one, should suffice to meet defendant's burden).
176. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2763 (Souter, J., dissenting).
177. Id at 2758 (Souter, J.,dissenting) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973)); Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55

(1981)).
178.
179.

See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2758-59 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2761 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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text[,] '""' because employers would be forced to put their reasons in
the record, while at the same time freeing employees from the tremendous burden of discrediting every conceivable reason vaguely
inferred by the record. Plaintiffs would still have to prove intentional
discrimination to win a judgment.
It seems that showing "pretext" was never intended to mean that
a judgment is warranted per se. A more likely interpretation is that
showing pretext was simply a means to avoid a defendant's motion

for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56,"' because "pretext" in
Burdine was in the context of summary judgment avoidance by a

plaintiff.'

As Burdine stated, although the employer's reasons need

not be proved by a preponderance of evidence at the second stage,
they must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defen-

180. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.
181. Rule 56 reads (in pertinent part):
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
FED. R. Crv. P. 56(c).
182. Robert J. Gregory, There Is Life in That Old (I Mean, More "Senior") Dog Yet:
The Age-Proxy Theory After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. LJ. 391, 426
n.185 (1994) (arguing that "a question of fact as to pretext should be sufficient, under Hicks,
to bar summary judgment"); McGinley, supra note 170, at 256 (arguing that when a defendant moves for summary judgment, "the quantum and quality of the defendant's proof should
determine the proof the plaintiff needs to present in order to raise a genuine issue of material
fact. When a plaintiff raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a defendant's
articulated reason is pretextual, the court should deny the defendant's motion"). See, e.g.,
Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Pub]. Co., 9 F.3d 913 (11th Cir. 1993); Sischo-Nownejad v.
Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that "[tihe
existence [of pretext] will ordinarily preclude the granting of summary judgment"); Chauhan
v. M. Alfieri Co., 897 F.2d 123, 124 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting "[t]h[is] case is close, but we
find that the inconsistencies and implausibilities contained within [defendant's] explanation for
its conduct are of sufficient magnitude to constitute enough evidence of pretext for the plaintiff to survive summary judgment"); Cotton v. City of Alameda, 812 F.2d 1245, 1248 (9th
Cir. 1987) (quoting Steckl v. Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983)) (finding, in
order to avoid summary judgment, plaintiff must "tender a genuine issue of material fact as
to pretext"); Reiff v. Philadelphia County Court C.P., 827 F. Supp. 319, 324-25 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (stating that a plaintiff who offers reasonable sufficient evidence of pretext along with
the elements of a prima facie case will survive a summary judgment motion); Lasher v.
Metropolitan Structures, 753 F. Supp. 1450 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (denying summary judgment for
defendant where there was conflicting evidence whether its asserted reason for termination lack of work - was true). See also Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th
Cir. 1994); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, No. 92-55124, 1993
U.S. App. LEXIS 35602 (Nov. 5, 1993); Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 814 F.2d 893 (3d
Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987); Nahrebeski v. Cincinnati Milacron
Mktg. Co., 835 F. Supp. 1130 (W.D. Mo. 1993). But see Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., 5
F.3d 955 (5th Cir. 1993); Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 849 F. Supp. 996 (D.N.J. 1994).
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dant." The majority accurately observes that showing pretext is far
less than showing the requisite discriminatory intent needed to pre-

vail."8 Therefore, it seems reasonable to infer that showing pretext

was designed to thrust the case into a full blown trial, but not to

force a judgment.'
The Court in Burdine stated that "there may be some cases
where the plaintiff's initial evidence, combined with effective crossexamination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defendant's
explanation."" 6 This supports the tenet that a plaintiff who has

shown pretexts will get to a trial, at which time effective cross may
disclose unlawful intent to discriminate. The above interpretation may
be harmonized with Hicks because the "suspicion of mendacity" element noted by the Hicks court,' may be fulfilled by the effective
cross-examination referred to in Burdine.

Pretext shows a triable issue of credibility warranting a trial and,
thus, the plaintiff will survive a summary judgment motion. If the
plaintiffs cross-examination is effective and/or the defendant's credibility is damaged or the plaintiffs bolstered by other testimony, the
factfinder can infer intentional discrimination and plaintiff may win a

judgment. 88 Plaintiffs who lack the proverbial "smoking gun" may
win a judgment based on circumstantial evidence, but pretext alone is
insufficient to compel such judgment.

Glenn H. Egor

183. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981).
184. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2751. See also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (finding that establishing a prima facie case "is not onerous"); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen,
983 F.2d 509, 523 (3d Cir.) (stating that a "prima facie case is easily made out"), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993); West v. Swift, Hunt & Wesson, 847 F.2d 490, 491 (8th Cir.
1988) (stating that the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination is "relatively light").
185. See supra text accompanying note 181.
186. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.10.
187. The Court stated that a prima facie case together with a suspicion of mendacity may
suffice for a judgment. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
188. See Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1189 (1994); see also Warren v. Halstead Indus., 802 F.2d 746, 753 (4th
Cir. 1986) (stating that "[p]laintiff's initial evidence should be combined with the evidence
arising from cross-examination in order to determine whether the defendant's reasons are
legally sufficient or whether they should be discredited" at trial), reh'g granted, 814 F.2d 962
(1987), on reh'g, 835 F.2d 535, and cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1218 (1988).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol12/iss1/5

24

